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Abstract 
The installation session treated seven subjects of 
immediate interest to the LHC project: scheduling, safety, 
LHC and SPS access system issues, progress in the QRL 
installation and first experiences of QRL operations, 
progress of the TS-MME work packages, Electrical 
Quality Assurance and magnetic circuit verification. The 
sessions gave a good overview of the progress and the 
important issues in this phase of the project. Safety 
remains as always an important subject with so many 
concurrent activities in the tunnel. 
ARE WE STILL ON TIME? – S. WEISZ 
The presentation gave an overview of the project status as 
it was a year ago, showed the impressive progress made 
during the last 12 months and discussed finally what 
delays can be expected if the current installation rates 
were maintained. S.Weisz also gave a perspective of 
some of the presently well-understood “hard” limits that 
have to be overcome if the current delays are to be 
recuperated. Earlier delays have been handled by 
excluding some extensive tests from the schedule e.g.  the 
planned cold tests for the entire  QRL complex have been 
restricted to sectors (7-8 & 8-1). It is assumed that these 
tests are representative of the other sectors. Another 
strategy change is to install magnets completely in 
parallel with the QRL installation and leak tests.  
Today however, the QRL installation is about three 
months behind schedule. In sector 7-8 the sub-sectors A 
& B were expected to be ready in July, the cold tests 
started mid-September and the completion of the full 
sector which was expected for September, was finally 
done in December In sector 8-1 the cold tests were 
expected for September, and were done in December 
2005. Here a delay of three months exists with respect to 
the schedule.  
The Distribution Feed Box project has suffered delays 
that still are not completely recovered, despite concerted 
efforts from AT, TS and IHEP, a six months delay exists 
relative to the schedule. 
Magnet transportation capacities have been improved 
from a nominal 10 magnets/week to 20 magnets/week. 
However in 2005 although it was expected to transport 
~600 magnets, only 249 were handled. This implies a 4 
months delay assuming that the transport rate 20 
magnets/week is maintained.  
In 2005, despite the progress, delays between 3 and 5 
months have been introduced, sometimes for reasons of 
missing/late equipment and sometimes due to 
overoptimistic estimations of actual work duration and an 
underestimation of the impact of co-activities. The project 
has gained much experience with new activities: QRL 
pressure and associated cold tests, large scale magnet 
transports, interconnect issues, the installation and tests of 
power converters, etc. It is now well understood that leak 
tests and leak finding in the QRL are very delicate 
activities and that they consume more time than initially 
expected.  
The known “hard limits” for the LHC installation 
originates in the following subprojects or activities: QRL, 
magnet transportation, special SSS procurement and 
DFB. 
The present schedule for QRL installation indicates that 
the QRL installation in sector 1-2 is finalized by 
November 2006. Any leak testing and repair delays have 
to be added to this date. 
The magnet transport rates are given by the following 
elements:  LHC has 1232 main dipoles, 24 Low-β, 24 
long special SSS, 16 D1/2/3/4 = 1296 main magnetic 
elements that are transported with CTV and MCTV 
convoys.  Of these, 240 dipoles are in place today, leaving 
1056 elements on the surface. With an assumed transport 
rate with CTV & MCTV convoys of 15 elements/week 
until Easter and an accelerated rate with 18 
elements /week, transportation will last for 61 weeks (end 
date March 2007). By using Point 6 for SSS elements 
going to sector 5-6 and 6-7 the delay expected can be 
reduced to three months relative to the present schedule. 
The rate of production of special SSS has to increase; 
presently the last special SSS will be installed in the 
tunnel at the end of March 07. 
The present schedule for the DFBs are indicating a lag of 
up to four months in the installation compared to the 
magnet installation – this issue has been acknowledged 
and steps are being taken to remedy it. 
 
The scenario for interconnection and handover of the 
sectors to the Hardware Commissioning team has been 
worked out and presently it assumes a minimum of 95 
days between the end of the magnet transport and the 
availability of the sector for HW commissioning. In 
addition to this constraint the complexity of the DFB’s are 
such that it is assumed that a minimum of 80 days 
between the installation of DFBA’s and the sector 
becoming available for HW commissioning is required.   
 
The schedule presentation’s first conclusion: many new 
activities were successfully ramped-up in 2005: QRL 
repair, installation and tests; surface logistics, preparation 
and underground magnet transport; alignment, and 
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interconnection in a difficult environment (tight space 
with many co-activities). 
The conclusion on the status of the installation today 
versus present planning shows that actual delays span 
from 3 to 4 months. Certain equipment or subsystems are 
late: DFB’s, special Short Straight Sections. Certain 
activities take presently longer than expected initially, in 
particular leak tests and leak finding.  
The Hardware commissioning planning is presently as 
follows: Sector 7-8 should be ready for hardware 
commissioning by August 2006; the hardware 
commissioning of Sector 8-1 will not be finished this 
year. The last Sectors (1-2 & 2-3) should be ready for 
HW commissioning by August 2007. The present DFB 
schedule imposes severe constraints on the HW 
commissioning as regards time and location. 
 
SAFETY IN TIMES OF INTENSE CO-
ACTIVITIES – M. VADON 
In view of the unprecedented co-activity and tension the 
compressed schedule imposes, M. Vadon – the LHC 
project safety officer - was invited to give an overview of 
how to best ensure that project engineers always give 
safety priority. The speaker presented a list of accidents 
reported, ranging from falling off scaffolding to fatal 
incidents. In too many cases the written procedures have 
not been followed, in some cases non-conform machinery 
have been used, resulting in fingers being cut off etc.  
Many incidents concern electrical cabling, cables are 
being cut without the worker having ensured that no 
power is present. M.Vadon reported that 45 accidents or 
incidents were declared in 2005, 14 were followed by an 
inquiry, and he presume that probably many more were 
not declared.  After investigation it often appears that 
procedures are incorrectly applied, changed at the last 
minute, not followed or even worse non-existing. The 
personnel involved are from sub-contractor companies, or 
are interim man power or experts being over-confident 
with many years of experience. 
Typical recurrent problems identified are related to the 
PPSPS (Plan de Prevention de Securité) which must be 
up-to-date, accurate and adapted to the situation at hand; 
works are not declared, or continue beyond what has been 
declared or authorised; the safety perimeters not 
respected; a lack of supervision and preparation; smoking 
and missing personal protection equipment etc.. 
The documents related to safety conditions are required 
for contractual and legal reasons. The consequences of 
accidents where the legal situation is not correct can be 
catastrophic for the project – an accident at SLAC shut 
down the accelerators for a 6 months period.  
The presentation underlined that work that is not well 
prepared before-hand, work that is difficult, has a high 
risk to induce loss of time, quality and accidents. 
The LHC Safety team has been given extra resources – 4 
more safety specialists will be available from March 
2006. 
These specialists are available to all LHC project 
engineers for consulting in matters of safety. The 
hierarchical responsibility is however always maintained 
in all cases – neither the LHC safety engineers nor the SC 
can be considered responsible in case of accidents. An 
LHC project engineer is the person responsible for 
ensuring that his/her project is a safe project.  
The presentation concluded: An accident may have 
catastrophic consequences on the whole project; the 
compression of the planning must be done without 
compromise on safety. The responsibility for this is borne 
by the LHC project engineers. 
 
LHC ACCESS – WHERE DO WE STAND? 
– P. NININ 
The LHC Access System project was restarted in 
November 2004; in January 2006 the pilot installation in 
the old TCR was assessed by the LHC, AB and TS top 
management and given production approval. The LHC 
Access control system comprises two separate subsystems 
LASS and LACS, see Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1 - LHC Access system concept 
 
 The LHC Access system is large, see Figure 2 which 
shows the scope of the project. The goals of the system 
can be summarised: the system shall protect human 
beings from radiation first and foremost by ensuring that 
if a person is inside there shall be no beam in LHC and  if 
there is a beam in LHC no person shall be inside. A major 
difference of the LHC access system compared with 
earlier access control systems at CERN is the LHC INB 
status. The French INB authorities have the right and the 
duty to inspect and give their reasoned opinion on the 
proposed LASS system architecture before any 
implementation is launched. The architecture was 
reviewed at a number of occasions with the authorities 
and a major modification in the form of an extra 
independent cabled loop was added. The resulting 
architecture now offers redundancy and has no common 
mode of failure.  
The status of the LASS is as follows: the hardware 
and software architecture prototyping is terminated; the 
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identification and documentation of the interlocked LHC 
machine elements is completed; the INB documentation 
has been completed and the required safety studies are 
completed. 
A contract for the implementation of the system was 
signed in October 2005 and the design of the final 
hardware and software is progressing with good results. 
The success of the LHC access project depends also on 




Figure 2 - LHC Access control system scope 
 
 
The main conclusions: the project is on track; the INB 
issues had been well managed by ensuring that a 
comprehensive and relevant documentation was available 
from the start of the project. 
A strong accent is put on configuration management with 
strict application of ECR methodologies – traceability is 
an INB requirement. The next challenge will be to move 
from a functional prototype to a robust system. The 
continued support and participation from AB is vital to 
finalise the remaining specification work and TS/CSE is 
fully mobilised to deliver a well working system. 
 
SPS ACCESS SAFETY SYSTEM – 
P. LIENARD, E. MANOLA-POGGIOLI 
 
The presentation gave an overview of the present SPS 
access system. When CERN signed the INB treaty with 
France both LHC, SPS and CNGS were included inside 
the INB classed perimeter. The SPS system, despite its 
excellent safety record is not considered to have a safe 
architecture by the INB authorities. The system is not 
designed using diverse, redundant technology, see Figure 
3.  All safety functions are executed in a Siemens S5 PLC 
based architecture, and single points of failure do exist 
while the INB architecture policy is to always have 
redundancy in all critical safety systems. In order to 
provide a system that complies with the INB safety policy 
an upgrade of the SPS access system is thus required. 
This upgrade project will eventually result in a 
completely new SPS access control system, using the 
LHC access system as model. The upgrade will be 
deployed in three phases, ideally in sequence in the next 
major yearly accelerator shutdowns to avoid losing 
valuable physics time. In the first phase, required for the 
2006 startup, compensatory measures will be added to the 
access system. In the shutdown 2006-2007 a cabled loop, 
similar to the one deployed for the LHC will be added to 
the existing system. In the following shutdowns the kernel 
of the system and the different access points will be 
upgraded. A detailed schedule will be worked out during 
the spring 2006. 
 
 
Figure 3 - SPS Access control system architecture 
 
The compensatory measures will necessarily bring 
inconveniences to the access and operation of the SPS but 
no other choice exists presently. It was not conceivable to 
launch a major hardware upgrade within the short delays 
and with the resources available. The main points of these 
compensatory measures are described below. 
 
The access doors will have locked caps on their direction 
of entry – emergency exits will always be maintained and 
are not concerned by this measure. However a number of 
sector doors in the transfer lines that can be used as 
emergency exits will be connected directly to neighboring 
AUG chains. 
 
The opening of any of these doors will automatically 
trigger an emergency stop of the SPS machine. The doors 
will be equipped with a signpost clearly indicating the 
above condition. 
In the shutdown 2006-2007 with the addition of a cabled 
loop the SPS system will have an adequate architecture. 
The cabled loop functionality is however limited in scope 
– it, in parallel with the present PLC based system, shall 
ensure that in all cases any intrusion through the external 
envelope is detected and the SPS is stopped. 
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TS-MME WORKPACKAGES – V. 
VUILLEMIN 
The TS department provides design, engineering and 
manufacturing support to the LHC equipment groups in 
both the AT and AB departments. The presentation 
gave an overview of the activities particularly linked to 
the AB department’s BDI and ATB groups. The policy 
of the TS department is to accept work in the form of 
work-packages, packages that have well defined 
objectives, clearly understood resource requirements 
and deliverables. The AB/BDI group is responsible for 
the LHC beam instrumentation in general, installation 
issues will be resolved in collaboration with the TS/IC 
and TS/MME groups. The presentation gave an 
overview of the different instrumentation types that will 
be designed, manufactured and installed and the 
volumes involved. For the “classical” beam 
instrumentation concerning devices such as beam 
position monitors, beam tv screens, gas ionization 
monitors, flying wire scanners, beam loss monitors and  
current transformers two design engineers and 11 
designers are active. The CERN internal manufacturing 
effort for this package, excluding some BPM’s and the 
BLM’s is estimated to be, until March 2006 3’500 
man-hours. 
The progress of this work-package has been 
satisfactory, the design work is nearly finished in all 
cases, and manufacturing is progressing well. Some of 
the instruments require access to specialized machine 
tools such as electron beam welding machines which 
are in general already in strong demand, thus forcing 
the TS/MME group to set priorities.  
 
 
Figure 3 - Beam monitoring devices 
 
Figure 3 above gives an impression of the variety of the 
beam instrumentation devices that are being designed and 
manufactured. 
 
The second major TS/MME work-package concerns the 
LHC collimators. This package and its conditions date 
back to the EST division era:  
“The EST provided output will be the required number 
of prototype collimators within the required schedule and 
drawings for the series production”. 
 
Since then the requirements have gone through a 
considerable evolution with the equipment group 
deepening its understanding of the system. The number of 
collimators and their associated masks has seen some 
inflation compared with the original estimates in the 
project and more than 700 blueprints have been created 
over the two last years. 
The speaker expressed some general concerns 
concerning the Collimator project’s production phase. 
Since presently TS/MME has no slack in its production 
facilities nor in its user support team; no additional help 
for any production/repair/quality control should be 
envisaged. The AB department must provide its own 
resources for the complete handling of the 10 collimators 
delivered by the Contractor each month.  
The TS/SU group has made a proposal based on their 
experience from other accelerators, for a system to make 
regular control of the alignment of the collimators once 
they are installed taking into account the highly 
radioactive environment. The speaker encouraged AB to 
provide an answer to the proposal without too much 
delay. 
 
The presentation ended with some general comments on 
present and planned future activities, priorities and 
available resources.  
For the months of January to April 2006 11.000 hours of 
work are already scheduled in the TS assembly shops, 
implying that overtime will be necessary. The LHC has 
obviously a high priority, but activities for the LHC 
experiments are equally important and cannot be 
neglected.  
 
The resources presently allocated to the two AB work-
packages are extensive. For the beam instrumentation 
work-package directly assigned are 11 designers and 6-7 
persons from the assembly workshop. For the collimator 
work-package, directly assigned are 3-4 designers (13 
different types of collimators have to be designed) with 3-
4 additional designers assigned to the masks design (7 
different types).  In addition the project coordinators, the 
outsourcing team from the workshop and the mechanical 
workshop, the surface treatment team, mechanical 
engineers and applied physicists are making substantial 
contributions. 
  
For any new problem, TS/MME will assist in the search 
for external support but it should be kept in mind that this 
also requires the use of scarce resources. 
 
As a final note it was underlined that experience however 
shows that urgencies where TS/MME must be present 
with its specific expertise in e.g. welding regularly occurs 
(LEIR, SSS in Building 904, ATLAS). 
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QRL INSTALLATION AND FIRST 
EXPERIENCES OF OPERATION – G. 
RIDDONE 
The presentation started with an overview of the QRL 
design, system architecture and implementation. The 
progress of the installation done by the turn-key 
Contractor is presented in Figure 4. Data for sector 7-8 
are not given since it is installed by CERN.  
 
 
Figure 4 - QRL Installation progress 
 
The schedule given by the subcontractor and presented by 
the speaker also takes leak repair delays into account, 
bringing the final delivery date to December 2006. The 
last sector to be installed is 1-2.  A view of the cryogenics 
surface installations confirms the industrial size of the 
project and the progress made, see Figure 5. Another 
QRL start-up issue mentioned is the flushing and cleaning 
of the entire installation which will require outmost 
carefulness and sufficient time to be completed. The 
performance of the 8-1 sector has been subject to an 
extensive measurement campaign by the QRL team since 
it is the first in the series of eight. This campaign is 
expected to give valuable information of what cryogenic 
performance can be expected of the complete LHC 
cryogenic system.   
 
The installation of the QRL, the supporting cryogenics 
complex on the surface and overall performance so far 
can be resumed: Cold reception tests have been 
successfully performed for sub-sectors A and B in 7-8, 
and sector 8-1. The QRL design in its thermo-mechanical 
aspects is successfully validated and the cryogenic 
thermometer accuracy is much better than the 
specifications required.  The heat in-leaks to the 50-75 K 
circuit (headers E and F) are within specification while 
for sector 7-8 (sub-sectors A and B) heat in-leaks to the 4-
20 K circuit (headers B, C and D) are above specification.  
Three possible causes for this non-conformity have been 
identified so far: the thermal shield temperature is higher 
than expected; the QRL insulation vacuum pressure is 
higher than nominal; the jumper insulation vacuum is 
above nominal pressure which has a direct impact on the 
heat flux through the MLI.  
 
 
Figure 5 - Cryogenics and QRL installations 
 
For sector 8-1, the heat in-leaks to the 4-20 K circuit are 
within specification. 
 
ELECTRICAL QUALITY ASSURANCE IN 
THE LHC TUNNEL (ELQA) AND 
MAGNET POLARITY COORDINATION 
(MR. POLARITY)  - STEPHAN 
RUSSENSCHUCK  
This presentation was split into two major parts as the 
title indicates. The speaker gave a concise definition of 
what is understood by the term Electrical Quality 
Assurance (ELQA) in this context: 
To ensure the integrity of the electrical circuits during 
machine assembly and commissioning and to guarantee 
that the electrical interconnections correspond to the 
LHC powering layout. To ensure traceability of checks 
while considering all electrical non-conformities; 
ELQA is not concerned with the qualification of 
individual components (polarity, continuity, labeling, 
electrical integrity, voltage taps, magnet type and 
position). 
 
An extensive effort has been deployed to create the 
necessary tools, both software applications and hardware 
devices to fulfil this challenging task. The team has set up 
a dedicated test bench which permits the simulation of a 
complete LHC half-cell electrically and to use it to 
finalise the various tools for use in the tunnel later.  
 
The speaker mentioned some of the more obvious errors 
discovered so far and underlined that the traceability of all 
actions undertaken must be sustained all along during the 
preparation and installation processes. The examples 
shown clearly indicate how easily errors creep in during 
the preparations and how difficult it is to first find the 
errors and then to correct them once the equipment is 
installed. In some cases the corrective action is “simply” a 
change of labels. If however the labels for one reason or 
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another are removed from the equipment, confusion is 
inevitable. Due to a partial traceability the error detection 
sometimes becomes pure detective work, trying to 
understood what the sequence of events have been – 
something definitely not acceptable when the work will 
progress on 8 fronts in parallel in the tunnel, see Figure 6.  
 
 
Figure 6 – ELQA - What happened? 
 
The second part of the presentation concerned the 
activities related to magnet polarity configuration 
management. This was identified as a critical issue at the 
last LHC Workshop and the speaker was given the co-
ordination task – Mr Polarity.    
 An instructive overview of the consequences of the 
different conventions used was given underlining the 
importance of this task. A specific case of polarity 
mismatch and the reasons behind it was demonstrated. 
When doing magnetic measurements tests of the DS-SSS 
a wrong polarity on the quadrupole of the external 
aperture was detected. The error causes were traced 
backwards and the demonstration showed that such errors 
are very easy to commit when the procedures are not 
sufficiently detailed and precise. 
 
The presentation concluded that the tools are available 
and can guarantee the integrity of the electrical 
interconnections in the LHC tunnel and detect polarity 
errors in the cryogenic magnets. However the project 
teams must remain vigilant and ensure the coherence of 
procedures and definitions (inner triplets, power supplies, 
controls, warm leads).  The team is ready to manage 
verifications in 8 fronts of arc interconnections, but it is 
limited in specialists for the follow up of electrical non-
conformities and it is suggested to improve the 
component verifications. 
Due to the tight schedule the ELQA of LSS and the 
LHC Hardware Commissioning will have to be performed 
in parallel. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Schedule – good progress has been made but present rates 
have to be further increased to meet our success oriented 
schedule. The presentation indicated some areas of 
concern that are now being attended to. New official 
schedule will be released during the spring. 
 
Security – accidents can and must be prevented. 
Responsibilities are DG-DH-GL-project engineer – no 
parallel hierarchy exists in matters of security. 
 
Access systems – LHC is back on track and doing good 
progress. The upgrade of the SPS system will be a major 
challenge to do in parallel with all the other activities. 
 
QRL – the supplier is now getting closer to the nominal 
rates. The issues about leak detection and repair delays 
will be permanently present during the installation. 
 
MME support – Presently there is no slack left in the 
group’s resource allocation. The design office and 
workshops are providing a major effort handling both 
planned and unplanned activities – Any new incidents or 
any badly organised projects will have to wait or will 
cause delays in other important activities. 
 
ELQA and Mr Polarity - Major exercises in quality 
control in the field, well prepared for a most challenging 
task.  
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